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I. Introduction: origin and evolution of head of state immunity 
 
The concept of immunity, i.e. that states and their highest representatives cannot be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of other states, is one of the oldest and most embedded 
principles in international public law.1 Early notions of immunity relied on the idea that the 
sovereign was the embodiment of the state and as such personally entitled to protection 
through immunity, which in turn meant that there was no distinction between ‘head of state 
immunity’ and ‘sovereign immunity.2. Heads of state largely enjoyed immunity from the 
jurisdiction of another state’s Courts, sometimes even their own: a representation of this is 
Louis XVI conveying the famous phrase: ‘L’état c’est moi’. However, over the last two 
centuries monarchical structures began to rapidly decline and with them, the doctrine of 
absolute immunity. Parallelly, principles of independence of states and sovereign equality 
were evolving, and the role of immunity changed from protecting the sovereign as an 
individual, to protecting the state as an entity. After World War II, absolute immunity was 
consolidated in favor of a more limited form of immunity for heads of state, in which mainly 
matters involving the exercise of sovereign authority (acta iure imperii) were protected from 
foreign domestic or international jurisdiction while commercial transactions (acta iure 
gestionis) were left out.3  
Notwithstanding that the doctrine of immunity has significantly evolved from an absolute 
concept to a more restrictive one, the legal position of heads of state remains questioned to 
this date. Particularly the development of humanitarian international law and human rights, 
have sparked a debate in legal scholarship and judicial practice over the question whether 
international law recognizes exceptions to immunities granted to heads of state or other 
government officials in respect of the commission of international crimes.4 
This paper is aimed at contributing to that debate by studying the concept of immunity for 
serving and former head of state immunity before international and foreign national criminal 
courts, paying special attention to a possible customary international law exception in the 
case of international crimes. The research will first delve into the scope and rationale of the 
                                                     
1
 Tangermann, p. 86; Cassese, International Law, p. 98; Doehring, p. 284; in relation to german MPs: Schulze-
Fielitz, Art. 46 GG, in: Dreier (ed.), GG, para. 21; Ambos, in: Joecks/Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum 
Strafgesetzbuch, Vorbemerkung zu § 3, para. 104; Horsthemke, p. 35. 
2
 Fox, Webb, p. 991; Shaw, p. 523-524; Foakes, p. 12, 13; Ehlers, in: Schoch/Schneider/Bier (eds.), 
Vorbemerkung § 40, in: Verwaltunsgerichtsordnung, para. 41; Mallory, Colum. L. Rev. 86/1986, p. 169 (170, 179); 
George, Fordham L. Rev. 64/1995, p. 1051 (1056); (466); Tunks, Duke LJ 52/2002, p. 651 (655). 
3
 Crawford, p. 1115; Foakes, p. 15; Streinz, in: Sachs (ed.), Grundgesetz, Art. 25 GG, para. 55; Herdegen, in: 
Maunz/Dürig (eds.), Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Art. 25 GG, para. 52. 
4
 Judicial practice: Cour de Cassation, [Chambre criminelle] (General Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal of Paris v 
Gaddafi) Judgment, Decision No. 64, 13 March 2001; Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary 
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)1 A.C. 147 [1999] [hereinafter Pinochet No. 3]; Academic discussion: 
van Alebeek, p. 1 ff.; Tunks, Duke LJ 52/2002, p. 651 (651, 652); Cassese, EJIL 13/2002; AJIL 98/2004, p. 407 
(407, 408); Stern, ILSA 14/2008; Akande, Shah, EJIL 21/2011, p. 815 (816); Mettraux, et al., Int. Crim. Law Rev 
18/2018, p. 577 (577); Tladi, LJIL 32/2019, p. 169 (169). 
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modern immunity concept, highlighting its origin from the doctrine of state immunity. 
Subsequently, this work will look at the conceptual distinction between two forms of 
immunity, ratione materiae and ratione personae, defining their nature and scope. The focal 
point of the research is the third part of the paper: first, the crimes for which a head of state 
may be held criminally responsible are defined by reference to different sources of 
international law. Second, an analysis of whether there is a customary law exception to head 
of state immunity in case of international crimes is made. Because this issue arises at a 
national and supranational level, the study is structured accordingly. The methodology 
adopted is academic and case law specific: an overview at the current state of the debate is 
provided, followed by an analysis and critical assessment of two landmark judgments, one 
before a foreign national court (Pinochet No. 3) and one before the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) (Omar Al-Bashir). Finally, a summary of the most important thesis will be 
presented accompanied by an outlook on future developments within this context. 
 
II.  The concept of head of state immunity in international law 
 
1. Starting point: The principle of state immunity 
 
In international law, immunity grants certain officials due to their special status, e.g. as heads 
of state, protection from being subjected to any foreign domestic jurisdiction (or even any 
jurisdiction entirely) and thus enjoy freedom from prosecution.5 Immunity protects the state 
and its highest representatives from foreign scrutiny. There are conceptually different 
categories of immunity, being the origin of modern head of state immunity the principle of 
state immunity. This international law doctrine, which is fundamental for the effective 
functioning of inter-state relations, is largely based on the core principle of sovereign equality 
enshrined in article 2 (1) UN Charter ‘The organization is based on the principle of sovereign 
equality of all its Members’ and developed from the maxime par in parem non habet 
imperium,6 by virtue of which equal states shall have no sovereignty over each other, 
including no exercise of jurisdiction (par in parem non habet iudicium).7 The first judicial 
assessment on state immunity is universally agreed to be The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon dating back to the year 1812, in which Chief Justice Marshall of the US Supreme 
Court remarked that ‘one sovereign being is in no respect amenable to another8’. However, 
with granting immunity to the state as an entity comes conferring it to the individuals who act 
                                                     
5
 Tangermann, p. 86; Doehring, p. 284; Ambos, Vol. I, p. 406; Kadelbach, in: von der Groeben/Schwarze/Hatje, 
para. 5; Ambos, in: Joecks/Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, Vorbemerkung zu § 3, 
para. 104. 
6
 ‘An equal has no power over an equal’ 
7
 Cassese, International Law p. 98; Senn, p. 34; Ambos, Vol. I, p. 407; Crawford, p. 1039; Fox, Webb, p. 148; 
Ambos, in: Joecks/Miebach (eds.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, Vorbemerkung zu § 3, para. 
105; Paulus, NJW 1999, p. 2644 (2645). 
8
 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, p. 11 U.S. 127. 
 
3 
through it. The principle of state immunity would be completely undermined if heads of state 
or other high-ranking officials were not personally protected from foreign interference: hence, 
head of state immunity is included in the doctrine of state immunity.9 Besides, because it is 
granted for the benefit of the state it is also in its power to waive it.10 There is a threefold 
rationale for upholding head of state immunity before international and domestic criminal 
courts: firstly, it assures the free conduct of foreign affairs and other duties related to their 
official capacity; secondly, it manifests respect towards the principles of sovereign immunity 
and sovereign equality and finally it is justified by reciprocal courtesy towards sovereign 
state’s heads of state.11 Conversely, heads of state should respect human rights, jus cogens 
prohibitions and international humanitarian law. In this sense, it is worth noting that positive 
international law does not recognize criminal responsibility of states, therefore it is important 
that the conduct is attributable to an individual, which could be the head of state or someone 
in an equivalent position.12 In respect to the nature and scope of immunity for serving and 
former heads of state, the next chapter will provide a more detailed evaluation of the two 
immunity categories there are in international law. 
 
2. Types of immunity: ratione materiae and ratione personae 
 
As mentioned beforehand, heads of state historically enjoyed certain privileges which were 
largely based on notions of superiority of the sovereign but also dignity of the state. Immunity 
is still enjoyed by heads of state and other government officials to this date but is now traced 
back to grounds of sovereign equality and state immunity; ‘par in parem non habet 
imperium’.13 When addressing the contemporary concept and scope of immunity as well as 
its basis and purpose under international public law, a crucial distinction must be made 
between: 
(a) Sitting and former heads of state and 
(b) Immunity ratione materiae (functional immunity) and ratione personae (personal 
immunity) 
The first distinction appears obvious, since it is only coherent that sitting heads of state, who 
carry out sovereign duties, have a differentiated status than former heads of state, who no 
longer hold an official post. The second distinction accomplishes this differentiation: while 
immunity ratione personae serves to shield heads of states from foreign criminal jurisdiction 
                                                     
9
 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) [2002] Judgment, ICJ Rep. 
2002, p. 22, para. 53 [hereinafter Arrest Warrant]; Art. 2 (1) (a) (i) UNGA Res., UNCSI, Doc No. A/RES/59/38, 2 
December 2004; Fox, Webb, p. 1255; Brohmer, LJIL 12/1999, p. 361 (364); Akande, Heads of State Immunity is 
a Part of State Immunity: A response to Jens Iverson, https://www.ejiltalk.org/head-of-State-immunity-is-a-part-of-
State-immunity-a-response-to-jens-iverson/ (last accessed on 6/09/2020). 
10
 Crawford, p. 912; Piero Buzzini, LJIL, 22/2009, p. 455 (474). 
11
 Senn, p. 35; Mallory, Colum. L. Rev. 86/1986, p. 169 (179); Zappalà, EJIL 12/2001, p. 595 (599); Tunks, Duke 
LJ 52/2002, p. 651 (655). 
12
 ICJ, In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] Judgment, ICJ Rep. 2007, para. 170; O’Keefe, p. 49. 
13
 Foakes, p. 8; O’Keefe, Immunity Ratione Materiae, p. 2. 
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for the duration of their office for both official and private acts, immunity ratione materiae 
prohibits states from exercising their criminal jurisdiction over former foreign head of states 
for official acts done while in office.14 These two immunity categories, namely functional 
(ratione materiae) and personal (ratione personae) immunity, are a generally accepted 
distinction supported by legal literature and largely based on state practice.15 
Immunity ratione materiae encompasses all official acts carried out in an official capacity on 
behalf of the state.16 Beneficiaries are therefore heads of state and other state officials who 
perform acts of set nature as part of their duty.17 Its scope is broader than that of state 
immunity, since it not only covers acts of sovereign authority (acta iure imperii) but also 
private economic activities of the state (acta iure gestionis), provided that they are not carried 
out in a purely private capacity.18 The primary duty of a head of state is the fulfilment of 
sovereign functions, which are in turn attributable to the state as an entity with independent 
sovereign power rather than to the individual who acts on its behalf. Therefore, the raison 
d’être behind this form of immunity is ensuring the fulfillment of official duties by the head of 
state or other officials without fearing prosecution or criminal liability.19 Considering the 
nature of the acts protected, immunity ratione materiae does not end with the cease of 
functions, but the individual remains entitled to immunity for official acts performed during 
his/her term in office.20 In principle, this form of immunity bars any criminal prosecution of 
former heads of state by foreign domestic courts, unless the state for which the head of state 
acted waives his/her right to immunity.21 However, as I will address in part three of this 
paper, it might not be the case anymore under current customary international law: the 
question therefore remains, if functional immunity can pose a bar to prosecution before 
foreign domestic courts regarding international crimes. In regard to international tribunals 
such as the ICC or special tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the question is to be answered negatively, as judicial practice has shown 
that former heads of state can in fact be rendered susceptible to prosecution and no waiver 
of immunity by the respective state is necessary.  
The second category is immunity ratione personae. Its conferral is attached to the office 
holder’s status as a representative of the state and as such, temporarily limited to the term in 
                                                     
14
 Shaw, p.554, 557; O’Keefe, Immunity Ratione Materiae, p. 1. 
15
 Cassese, International Criminal Law, p. 318-319; Senn, p. 42; Foakes, p. 7; Pedretti, p. 13; Horsthemke, p. 34; 
Zappalà, EJIL 12/2001, p. 595 (598); Cassese, EJIL 13/2002, p. 853 (862); Akande, AJIL 98/2004, p. 407 (409); 
Kreicker, ZIS 7/2009, p. 350 (351-353). 
16
 Shaw, p.557; Foakes, p. 7; Pedretti, p. 14.; Escobar Hernández, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 04/04/2013, UN Doc. A/CN.4/661, p.44; O’Keefe, Immunity Ratione Materiae, p. 2. 
17
 Shaw, p.557; Pedretti, p. 14. 
18
 Foakes, p. 7; Pedretti, p. 19; Kolodkin, Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, 10/06/2010, 
UN. Doc. A/CN.4/631, p. 16; D’Argent, CeDIE 04/2013, p. 8. 
19
 Cassese, International Criminal Law, p. 319; Foakes, p. 8; Cassese, EJIL 13/2002, p. 853 (863). 
20
 Doehring, p. 291; Regarding diplomatic agents: Foakes, p. 9; D’Argent, CeDIE 04/2013, p. 8. 
21
 Shaw, p.559; Foakes, p. 7; Gaeta, JICJ 1/2003, p. 186 (189); O’Keefe, Immunity Ratione Materiae, p. 2. 
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office.22 It can, however, end prematurely if it is waived by the home state.23 Hence, former 
heads of state and other high-ranking officials once they leave office, only enjoy the more 
limited immunity ratione materiae.24 In contrast to immunity ratione materiae, the protection 
offered by immunity ratione personae is absolute: it covers any act performed by the head of 
state or official in question, regardless of the official or private nature of the act and the place 
where or time when it was performed.25 Its personal scope is restricted to heads of state and 
other high-ranking officials (heads of government and ministers of foreign affairs) because 
only they, as permanent representatives embody or personify the state to such an extent that 
to perform their duties, they necessarily need to be shielded from any intervention by foreign 
domestic courts or even international tribunals.26 The justification for this immunity is the 
peaceful cooperation and co-existence among states, along with the free engagement in 
communications with other representatives and the conduct of international and diplomatic 
negotiations by those officials who represent the state at an international level.27 As 
expressed by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in their joint separate opinion in 
the Arrest Warrant case ‘[…] immunities are granted to high State officials to guarantee the 
proper functioning of the network of mutual inter-State relations, which is paramount 
importance for a well-ordered and harmonious system’.28 For a long time, it was settled 
customary international law that incumbent and former heads of state as well as other high-
ranking officials enjoyed total immunity from foreign criminal prosecution, by both domestic 
and international tribunals.29 However, currently it is debatable whether there is an exception, 
especially to immunity ratione personae under customary international law for international 
crimes, since such crimes affect the interest of the entire international community.30 
 
                                                     
22
 Arrest Warrant, para. 54; Akande/Shah, EJIL 21/2011, p. 815 (818). 
23
 Böse, in: Kindhäuser/Neumann/Paeffgen (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, para. 36; Escobar Hernández, Immunity of 
State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 04/04/2013, UN Doc. A/CN.4/661, p. 49; D’Argent, CeDIE 
04/2013, p. 8 
24
 Supra, at 19. 
25
 Senn, p.45; Böse, in: Kindhäuser/Neumann/Paeffgen (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, para. 36; Escobar Hernández, 
Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/CN.4/661, para. 44, 48; Zappalà, EJIL 
12/2001, p. 595 (599); Wirth, EJIL 13/2002, p. 877 (883). 
26
 Akande, Shah, EJIL 21/2011, p. 815 (818); D’Argent, CeDIE 04/2013, p. 6. 
27
 Pedretti, p. 28; Böse, in: Kindhäuser/Neumann/Paeffgen (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, para. 36; Zappalà, EJIL 
12/2001, p. 595 (599); Tunks, Duke LJ 52/2002, p.651 (656); Wirth, EJIL 13/2002, p. 877 (888); Akande, AJIL 
98/2004, p. 407 (410); Akande, Shah, EJIL 21/2011, p. 815 (818). 
28
 Joint separate opinion of judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium) [2002] Judgment, ICJ Rep. 2002, para. 75. 
29
 Arrest Warrant, para. 51; Doehring, p. 292; Senn, p. 44; Pedretti, p. 25; Horsthemke, p. 35; Böse, in: 
Kindhäuser/Neumann/Paeffgen (eds.), Strafgesetzbuch, para. 38; Escobar Hernández, Immunity of State 
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 04/04/2013, UN Doc. A/CN.4/661, p. 45. Zappalà, EJIL 12/2001, p. 
595 (599, 600); Cassese, EJIL 13/2002, p. 853 (864); Akande, AJIL 98/2004, p. 407 (413); D’Argent, CeDIE 
04/2013, p. 5. 
30
 Bassiouni, Law & Contemp. Probs. 50/1996, p. 63 (69). 
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III. Criminal responsibility of heads of state for international 
crimes– an (customary international law) exception to 
immunity? 
 
The question of whether heads of state can be made criminally liable for international crimes 
is one that has concerned the international community on a practical and academic level for 
some time now.31 The atrocities committed during World War II, condemned globally, brought 
profound changes in the international criminal law regime: the international community finally 
saw the need to provide concrete methods to achieve individual criminal responsibility. In 
turn, the increasing awareness for safeguarding human rights caused the partial erosion of 
deep embedded principles of state sovereignty and immunity. However, excluding the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials it was not until the close of the 20th century that this idea was 
materialized. There were multiple attempts from national and international tribunals to 
institute proceedings against heads of state and other state officials for the (alleged) 
commission of international crimes, some of which succeeded and ended with convictions for 
the perpetrators.32 Anyhow, the progress made in protecting human rights has not been 
without challenge. The question at the center of the debate is if there is an exception to the 
immunities enjoyed by former and sitting heads of state (ratione materiae in case of the 
former and ratione personae in case of the latter) for serious crimes under international law. 
Since there is no universally held position, this matter is highly controversial. On one hand, 
an ever more human rights centered global community seeks accountability for violations of 
the most fundamental human rights. There are different arguments to support an exception 
to immunity of heads of state: according to one view, international crimes can never qualify 
as sovereign or official acts and therefore do not fall per se under the scope of immunity 
protection.33 Another opinion appeals to an exception of head of state immunity under 
customary international law for serious crimes, noting that there is state practice and opinio 
juris that substantiate this position.34 Furthermore, the jus cogens prohibition of international 
crimes also supports this argument: since jus cogens norms have the highest status in 
                                                     
31
 Id. at 4. 
32
 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, 18 May 2012; ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Rodovan Karadžić, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, 24 March 2016; ICC, The Prosecutor v. 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, Judgment, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, 6 May 2019; Pinochet No. 3; IHT, 
The Public Prosecutor in the High Iraqi Court et al. v. Saddam Hussein Al Majeed et al., Case No. 29/c/2006, 26 
December 2006.  
33
 Joint separate opinion of judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium) [2002] Judgment, ICJ Rep. 2002, para. 85; van Alebeek, p. 99; Ambos, Vol. I, p. 411; Bianchi, EJIL 
10/1999 p. 237 (265); Tunks, Duke LJ 52/2002, p. 651 (659, 676); Stern, ILSA J. Int’I &Comp. L. 14/2008, p. 441 
(448, 449); Akande, Shah, EJIL 21/2011, p. 815 (828). 
34





international law, they shall always prevail over hierarchically lower (immunity) rules.35 The 
argument at the heart of this debate and which this paper focuses on is the customary law 
exception to immunity.  
On the other hand, head of state immunity is a necessary mechanism to conduct 
international relations. There is a tendency that invokes the importance of the head of state 
immunity doctrine in international law as well insufficient state practice to support the 
existence of a customary law exception for serious crimes under international law.36 This 
issue has likewise been addressed at the International Law Commission (ILC) which in its 
2017 report on ‘Immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction’ adopted Draft 
article 7, which provides an exception for immunity ratione materiae before foreign criminal 
jurisdictions for the crimes listed therein.37 At an academic level, the work of the ILC has 
been criticized for lacking foundation in international law or state practice.38 Another problem 
arises in relation to at which level these crimes should be prosecuted, since the 
administration of justice in relation to international crimes is formed of a patchwork system 
with the involvement of domestic courts, foreign domestic courts, international tribunals and 
ad-hoc tribunals. In this regard, the primary method of judicial prosecution is intended to be 
the domestic courts where the international crimes took place. However, very often the 
perpetrators as part of the state apparatus, pass legislation in their home state shielding 
themselves from prosecution for set crimes by granting themselves amnesty.39  
After having briefly introduced the current state of the matter, the next section of this paper is 
dedicated to determining what international crimes could possibly amount to an immunity 
exception. Subsequently, a general consideration about prosecution before (foreign) 
domestic and international courts will be presented which will be complemented by 
considering two of the most notorious cases of prosecutions of former and serving heads of 
state before a domestic court and the ICC respectively.  
 
1. Defining ‘Crimes under international law’ 
 
The international criminal responsibility of heads of state is only debatable when it comes to 
certain crimes under international law, i.e. international crimes. The highest representative of 
                                                     
35
 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis and Caflisch joined by judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and 
Vajić (Al-Adsani v The United Kingdom) Judgment, Application No. 35763/97, 21 November 2001, p. 30 para. 1; 
van Alebeek, p. 89; Ambos, Vol. I, p. 412, Bianchi, EJIL 10/1999, p. 237 (265); Orakhelashvili, EJIL 18/2007, p. 
955 (964). 
36
Arrest Warrant para. 3, 8; Cour de Cassation, [Chambre criminelle] (General Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal 
of Paris v Gaddafi) Judgment, Decision No. 64, 13 March 2001; Senn, p. 155; Akande, Shah, EJIL 21/2011, p. 
815 (817); O’Keefe, AJIL Unbound 109/2015, p. 167 (167). 
37
 ILC, Draft article 7, Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.893. 
38
 Klabbers, p. 114; Murphy, AJIL Unbound 112/2018; Shen, AJIL Unbound 112/2018, p. 9 (11); Forteau, AJIL 
Unbound 112/2018, p. 22 (25); van Alebeek, AJIL Unbound 112/2018, p. 27 (30) 
39
 Cryer et al., p. 54; Tiba, WJILDR 21/2013, p. 134 (135). In the context of the transition to democracy in Spain 
the ‘Amnesty Law’ (Ley 46/1977) was passed, which in its Art. 2 (e) (f) granted amnesty to ‘crimes committed by 
law enforcement officials and agents against the exercise of individual rights’ BOE No. 248, 17/19/1977. 
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a sovereign state may only be prosecuted for certain crimes, those considered to qualify 
either by customary or treaty law as internationally condemnable and therefore, punishable.40  
This chapter offers a framework in respect of such international crimes guided by one firmly 
consolidated treaty which holds an identifier status of customary international law: The 
Statute of the ICC, i.e. Rome Statute. Furthermore, as secondary sources and to 
complement the definitions comprised in the Rome Statute, other important international 
treaties will be consulted like the Geneva Conventions or the CAT. The Rome Statute sets 
forth the crimes that can be prosecuted by the ICC and enumerates in articles 6, 7, 8, 8bis 
Rome Statute the following: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crime of 
aggression.  
a) Genocide: article II of the genocide convention defines this crime as: ‘[…] Genocide 
means any of the following acts committed the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.41 This definition has been widely adopted at 
both national42 and international level, including in the 1998 Rome Statute, in the statutes 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and of the ICTY. This crime is 
directed towards a group, i.e. a permanent unity of people who share the same or some 
of the abovementioned characteristics. It protects mainly collective rather than individual 
interests.43 The prohibition of genocide has consistently concerned the global community 
since the Nuremberg Trials and although the term ‘genocide’ was not coined until after, 
the prosecutors then used the term ‘crimes against humanity’ instead. Genocide falls 
under the protective scope of jus cogens norms and is recognizably a customary 
international law rule, imposing an erga omnes obligation on states. 44 It is deemed to be 
as an exceptionally serious type of a crime against humanity.45 
b) Crimes against humanity: article 7 of the Rome Statute includes a list of ten offences 
which amount to crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, enslavement…) in 
addition to a residual category for comparable inhumane acts ‘when committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack’. Like the prohibition of genocide, crimes against humanity has 
consistently been codified in the statutes of international criminal tribunals. The elements 
of this crime are following: first there must be an attack, defined as a multiplicity of 
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unlawful or violent acts such as, but not limited to murder, torture, etc. Violent acts of a 
non-armed nature directed towards the mistreatment of the civilian population, (e.g. the 
system of apartheid) are encompassed by this definition.46 Second, the attack needs to 
be widespread or systematic. The ILC and in subsequent judgments of ad-hoc tribunals, 
the term ‘widespread’ has been defined as referring to a large-scale attack with 
numerous victims, whereas under ‘systematic’ a ‘preconceived plan or policy’ is 
understood.47 Finally, ‘civilian population’ makes reference to the fact that the attack must 
be directed to a certain number of persons that share common attributes and are not part 
of the armed forces, making it of a collective nature and excluding random acts of 
violence.48  
c) War crimes: war crimes are grave breaches of international humanitarian law (also 
known as laws of armed conflict or ius in bello) committed in the context of an armed 
conflict.49 There traditional distinction between international and domestic conflict (two 
box approach) is, since the Tadić decision, obsolete.50 There are three primary sources 
of war crime codifications: the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which restrained the 
use of certain methods and means of warfare; the Geneva Conventions of 1949 with 
primary focus on the protection of persons and property and finally, combining both 
systematics, Rome Statute. Article 8 (2) of the Rome Statute, which resembles greatly 
the definition of the Geneva Conventions, defines which specific offenses are meant 
under ‘war crimes’ (willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, etc.) while underlining in 
article 8 (1) that the Court has jurisdiction ‘in respect of such war crimes in particular 
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes.’ 
d) Crime of aggression: the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials prosecuted the crime of aggression 
(then ‘crime against peace’) for the first time. Since then, the definition has been 
constantly evolving, however scholars and academics tried to narrow the scope codify 
this crime in the Rome Statute. Finally, at the Kampala Conference in 2009, a binding 
definition for the ‘crime of aggression’ was adopted adding a new article 8bis to the Rome 
Statute. Article 8bis makes a distinction between the crime of aggression (article 8bis (1)) 
                                                     
46
 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-94-4-T, 2 September 1998, para. 581; 
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and an act of state aggression contrary to international law (article 8bis (2)). While the 
former determines individual responsibility under international criminal law, the latter 
concerns state responsibility under general international law as a necessary precondition 
for individual criminal responsibility.51 Even though highly controversial regarding the 
exact definition the customary law character of this crime is undisputed.52  
e)  Torture: according to the CAT, torture is any serious infliction of mental or physical pain 
by a state official or a private individual on behalf of or with the acquiescence of state 
authorities for a specific purpose, e.g. to force a confession.53 The CAT is legally binding 
and imposes various obligations on the states parties: they are required to take 
preventive measures to eradicate torture and to prosecute or extradite a foreign state 
officials, including heads of state, accused of torture or other acts falling within the scope 
of set Convention.54 The Convention has currently 170 state parties, therefore earning 
universal recognition. The prohibition and punishment of torture is clearly a jus cogens 
norm of international humanitarian law.55  
The primary purpose of prohibiting certain actions under international law, like those 
mentioned, is safeguarding global peace and international security. Therefore, it is equally as 
important to prosecute the individuals committing them. The abovementioned list of crimes 
are peremptory prohibitions of international law, jus cogens norms.56 Having had an overview 
of what offences are considered crimes under international law, the next chapter addresses 
the practical stance of the problem: can serving or former heads of state be held responsible 
for the commission of such atrocities? 
 
2. Horizontal Immunity: national criminal courts 
 
The principle ‘there is no right without a remedy’ is directly linked to idea that the recognition 
of individual human rights or the prohibition of conducts such as crimes under international 
law, is ineffective without the availability of (inter)national enforcement mechanisms in case 
of violations or breach of prohibitions.57 Primarily, human rights violations should be 
prosecuted where the crimes took place, as was the case with Saddam Hussein’s conviction 
by the Iraqi Special Tribunal or the constitution Extraordinary Chambers of Cambodia 
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(ECCC) to bring Khmer Rouge officials to justice.58 However, sometimes foreign domestic 
courts are the only available administers of justice to effectively prosecute and convict 
alleged criminal heads of state.59 A preliminary question that needs to be addressed is on 
what base foreign national courts obtain jurisdiction in the first place. To achieve an effective 
protection of human rights and the enforcement of international crimes prohibitions, an 
involvement of the global community is necessary through the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction allows national courts to claim jurisdiction over specific 
offences (jus cogens norms) like genocide, torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
irrespective of the territory where they took place or nationality of the offender.60  
The treaty basis for universal jurisdiction in relation to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.61 Foreign domestic courts can invoke 
this principle when their state has adopted legislation punishing the relevant offence, e.g. by 
ratifying the CAT, which is the first treaty to provide universal jurisdiction in matters relating to 
torture.62 Universal jurisdiction is based on the idea certain crimes harm the international 
community and its order as a whole, therefore individual states must act to protect it.63 
However, as noted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ‘jurisdiction does not imply the 
absence of immunity, while the absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction’ which means 
that functional and personal immunities are an additional burden for courts to surpass in their 
aim at holding heads of state responsible for serious criminal actions.64 For the traditional, 
state-oriented approach, head of state immunity is absolute and does not accept any 
exceptions on an inter-state level. The horizontal relationship between states expressed in 
the notion of sovereign equality and highlighted by the principle ‘par in parem non habet 
iudicium’ impede domestic courts from judging the conduct of a foreign head of state, as 
formulated by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) ‘A reason for the distinction […] 
between national Courts and international Courts […] would appear due to the fact that the 
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principle that one sovereign State does not adjudicate on the conduct of another State’.65  
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in the Al-Adsani case that the 
right to access a domestic court is not absolute but limited by the concept of sovereign 
immunity ‘by which one State shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of another State’.66 
Indeed, the horizontal relationship between equal states makes it hard for domestic courts to 
justify an exception to immunity ratione mateariae or (even less) personae to judge the 
behavior of a foreign former or sitting head of state, even for international crimes. The 
importance of a head of state in the constitutional and/or political structure of a sovereign 
country is not to be overlooked. Moreover, some argue that there is a risk of manipulation 
and politization of judicial decisions taken by domestic courts, which could be used to 
arbitrarily sabotage other states.67 Thus, the question remains there is an exception to head 
of state immunity before national courts in cases involving individual criminal responsibility 
for serious violations of international law either evolving or already established under 
customary international law. To provide a comprehensive approach, the elements of a 
customary international law rule should be mentioned. Customary international law emerges 
when there is sufficiently consolidated and widespread (although not universal) state practice 
and a sense of obligation or legal conviction, i.e. opinio juris to adhere to this practice.68  
In light of the underlying convictions regarding this topic, I will analyze one landmark 
judgment (Pinochet No. 3) and thereafter make a critical assessment of the most relevant 
arguments brought forward by each Law Lord.  
 
a) R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte. 
 
The starting point for arguments refusing to uphold immunity ratione materiae for former 
heads of state is undoubtably the judgment of the House of Lords in the Pinochet case. 
Chile’s ex-dictator, Augusto Pinochet, was arrested by British authorities in London in the 
year 1998 following an international arrest warrant issued by Spanish authorities under 
allegations of human rights abuses, torture, hostage-taking and genocide committed against 
Spanish and Chilean citizens during the military regime established in 1973. The core issue 
in the case concerned was whether Pinochet was entitled, as a former head of state, to 
immunity for the offences for which he was charged. Pinochet’s defense argued that his 
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status as a former head of state granted him immunity ratione materiae for all acts 
undertaken during his mandate. However, the second majority decision of the House of 
Lords held that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity for the torture charges after 1988 brought 
against him. The CAT, which entered into force in September of 1988 for the UK, conferred 
state parties universal jurisdiction over extraterritorial torture offences.69 Therefore, state 
parties to this Convention70 could not have, in light of this provision, reasonably intended for 
immunity ratione materiae to be upheld in proceedings concerning torture against former 
heads of state.71  
The arguments offered by the six out of seven judges who ruled out his immunity varied in 
their line of reasoning, so that different approaches can be discerned. On the one hand, Lord 
Brownie-Wilkinson, Hope and Saville largely based their arguments on the CAT and other 
positive sources of law and only excluded Pinochet’s immunity in respect of the torture 
charges after 1988.72 On the other hand, Lord Philipps, Millet and Hutton relied extensively 
on principles of international criminal law and on international law as such; with the two 
former Lords dissenting from the other four, maintaining that UK Courts had jurisdiction over 
acts of torture and other offences committed prior to that date.73 The starting point of the 
discussion was the distinction between immunity of a serving and former head of state: all 
Law Lords found it indisputable that if Pinochet were a serving head of state, he would as a 
matter of customary international and national law enjoy immunity ratione personae from all 
actions and prosecutions, whether relating to official or private activities.74 However, due to 
his status as a former head of state, he retained immunity ratione materiae which only covers 
official acts committed during his term. On the immunity question, Lord Brownie-Wilkinson 
argued that after the entry into force of the CAT for the UK when a head of state engages in 
the commission of torture, he/she cannot be considered as acting in a capacity which attracts 
immunity. The reason is that torture itself is contrary to international law and falls under a jus 
cogens prohibition, therefore these acts do not fall under the scope of protection of immunity 
ratione materiae.75 Similarly, Lord Hope emphasized that Chile’s obligations recognized by 
customary international law through the CAT effectively overrode the immunity ratione 
materiae he would otherwise have enjoyed.76 Lord Saville embraced the arguments brought 
forward by his colleagues, Lord Brownie-Wilkinson and Hope, while highlighting that ‘States 
who have become parties [to the CAT] have clearly and unambiguously agreed that official 
torture should now be dealt with in a way which would otherwise amount to an interference in 
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their sovereignty’.77  
Lord Hutton’s approach was, in comparison to the other Lordships, more hybrid. To argue his 
position, he relied on the CAT concluding that upholding his immunity ratione materiae would 
be in breach of set Convention.78 Furthermore, he reviewed sources of international law, 
stating that ‘since the end of the second world war, there has been a clear recognition by the 
international community that certain crimes are so grave and so inhuman that they constitute 
crimes against international law and that the international community is under duty to bring to 
justice a person who commits such crimes.’79 Therefore, Pinochet did not enjoy immunity 
ratione materiae for the crimes of torture brought against him after 29 September 1988.80 
Lord Millet’s and Lord Phillip’s reasoning was more international law centered than their 
fellow Lordships. Lord Millet undertook a careful analysis of the post-World War II evolution 
in relation to state immunity, clarifying that this development meant that large-scale or 
systematic torture ‘has come to be regarded as an attack upon the international order’.81 
Adding that ‘the systematic use of torture […] as an instrument of state policy and joined 
piracy […] as an international crime of universal jurisdiction well before 1984’.82 He then 
concluded that Pinochet should be extradited for all charges brought against him, regardless 
of when the (alleged) commission took place.83 In a similar vein, Lord Phillip argued that the 
conduct attributed to Pinochet is governed by international law, which does not grant former 
heads of state immunity before international criminal courts because the allegations brought 
against them where committed in an official capacity.84 He continued by denying the 
existence of any international law rule on immunity for former heads of state in respect of 
international crimes, including but not limited to torture.85 
The only dissenting opinion forwarded by Lord Goff brought up some counterarguments that 
will be briefly addressed. He held that the governmental functions of a head of state although 
they do not include purely private acts, they can certainly include criminal acts.86 He held that 
removing immunity could lead to ex-heads of state ‘being the subject of unfounded 
allegations emanating from states of a different political persuasion’.87 According to his 
understanding, only the CAT, to which all states involved where parties could have waived 
the right of Pinochet to head of state immunity ratione materiae: however, the CAT had not 
done so neither explicitly nor implicidly.88 He also emphasized the lack of settled practice 
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regarding an exception to immunity ratione materiae, therefore excluding a customary 
international law exception in regards to this matter.89  
 
b) Preliminary critical assessment  
 
The Pinochet No. 3 decision set out a major precedent, since for the first time a foreign 
domestic court challenged the immunity ratione materiae enjoyed by a former head of state 
in regard to international crimes. In the following paragraphs, a critical review of the 
arguments in relation to immunity put forward by the Appellate Committee of the House of 
Lords in the Pinochet No. 3 judgment will take place.  
From an international law perspective, the interpretation of British national law in light of 
customary international law offered by the Law Lords is certainly to be welcomed. The 
conclusion reached by the Law Lords was satisfactory, however the reasoning behind some 
aspects where somewhat contradictory or lacked legal or factual basis. Lord Brownie 
Wilkinson as did some other Lords argued that torture as a jus cogens prohibition did not 
attract immunity but only after the entry into force of the CAT for the UK. He argues that the 
principle of universal jurisdiction enshrined in the Convention is contrary to upholding 
Pinochet’s immunity ratione materiae. However, although this argument holds truth, there are 
other compelling reasons for excluding his immunity: namely a customary law exception. As 
Lord Millet rightly pointed out, customary international law has reached a stage of 
development in which universal jurisdiction is exercised by states in cases of international 
crimes when: (a) the crimes are prohibited by jus cogens and (b) they must be ‘so serious 
and on such a scale that they can justly be regarded as an attack on the international legal 
order’.90  
Since the case at hand fulfills both criteria, there is no question, in my opinion, that the 
Appellate Committee should have removed his immunity for all allegations and not only for 
those after the ratification of the CAT. Another question arises in regard to Lord Hutton’s 
conclusion that Pinochet had only lost immunity for torture charges after 1988. A closer 
reading of following statement given by his Lordship is necessary: ‘[…] they constitute crimes 
against international law and that the international community is under a duty to bring to 
justice such a person who commits such crimes. Torture has been recognized as such a 
crime’.91 He seemingly equates international crimes to torture, being the only logical 
implication of this that the immunity exception is not limited to torture but applies in relation to 
all international crimes.92  
Moreover, Lord Goff’s commentary on the effects of removing functional immunity of heads 
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of state should be addressed. Accurately, immunity is granted to heads of state in part to 
avoid being targets of malicious allegations. However, I cannot agree that an exception to 
immunity in cases of international crimes can actually have the effects he mentions, or at 
least to that extent. In a democratic state, if allegations brought against a former head of 
state are unfounded, the national court in question is under the obligation to dismiss the 
claims. Furthermore, governments influence on the judiciary is limited in a democratic state, 
so their political persuasions should not play a significant role when or if instituting 
proceedings. Also, prosecuting a former head of state can have serious political and 
economic implications for set state, therefore making it unlikely that governments will actually 
resort or influence prosecutions. It should also be mentioned that extradition process’ in 
many countries contains legal and procedural safeguards to avoid possible abuses.93  
Finally, it seems like Lord Goff’s dismisses the importance of individual criminal responsibility 
and human rights developments in international criminal law. The reason for removing 
immunity in this case, like many others, was to hold an ex-dictator accountable for appalling 
human rights violations committed during his mandate and under his orders. The CAT (along 
with other human rights instruments) was ratified by many states precisely for this reason: 
not appreciating an immunity exception in this case would vacate of content the rights and 
offences enshrined in the Convention, its raison d’être. In short, the concept of head of state 
immunity must necessarily undergo a modification or limitation for a ‘greater good’: the 
realization of human rights and its legal basis must be customary and treaty law.  
 
3. Vertical Immunity: International Criminal Courts 
 
In light of the abovementioned case, it is plausible for foreign domestic courts to admit an 
international crime exception for immunity ratione materiae of former heads of state, but any 
interference with the immunity ratione personae of serving heads of state is rejected. 
However, an incumbent head of state who commits international crimes is no less of a 
danger to global peace and security than a former head of state, hence why in proceedings 
before international criminal courts even personal immunities do generally not pose a hurdle 
to prosecution. This is due to the fact that all international(zed) tribunals have adopted 
provisions in their statutes which either limit or right out bar allegations of immunity to avoid 
prosecution.94 Furthermore, jurisprudence and state practice have confirmed the 
enforcement of these immunity provisions, possibly establishing it as a customary rule of 
international law.95  
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The system of international justice is complex and there are different categories of criminal 
tribunals, although presently the main criminal tribunal is the International Criminal Court. In 
the early 1990s, the Security Council, through the powers conferred by articles 41 and 42 
UN-Charter set up two ad-hoc tribunals: the ICTY (1993-2017) and ICTR, (1994-2015) which 
were limited to prosecute international crimes committed during the Balkan conflict and the 
Rwandan genocide respectively.96 Both statutes, of mandatory compliance for all member 
states of the UN,97 expressly excluded any status or immunity-related exception from 
prosecution so that all high ranking officials and heads of state or government could be 
tried.98 The Rome Statute follows a similar, more compelling pattern and contains a provision 
to overcome the problem of personal immunities. Based on article 27 of the Rome Statute 
whether immunities nor special procedural rules can bar the court form exercising its 
jurisdiction. The Rome Statute is not directly applicable and must be ratified by UN member 
states, who relinquish any immunity claims by freely accepting the application of the 
Statute.99 However, states which are parties to the UN but not to the ICC could also see their 
sovereignty weakened by the court’s jurisdiction. This would be the result of applying Article 
13 (b) Rome Statute which confers on the Security Council the power, acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, of referring a situation to the ICC.  
The last category of international criminal tribunals are ‘hybrid’ or ‘internationalized’ tribunals, 
which are institutions that incorporate elements of national and international law resulting in a 
mixed form of justice.100 Their statutes follow a slightly different approach, by including 
arguably unclear immunity exception norms which underline that the status of a person or a 
prior pardon shall have no influence or effect on the prosecution.101 However, state practice 
before hybrid tribunals has shown that these provisions have the same effect as an immunity 
exception clause.102  
Unsurprisingly, international tribunals have less difficulties at declaring immunity claims null 
and void than foreign domestic courts. The inherent international character of these courts 
indicates that they operate with support of the international community which in turn, 
prevents them from acting manifestly unfair, which is often problematic with foreign domestic 
courts.103 To this same conclusion came the SCSL, arguing that ‘[…] State immunity derives 
from the equality of sovereign States and therefore has no relevance to international criminal 
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tribunals […] [who] derive their mandate from the international community’.104 
International tribunals have made bold attempts at prosecuting some of the most infamous 
international criminals, without considering their position in the state’s apparatus. In many 
cases, the prosecutions succeeded and ended with convictions, even in regards of sitting 
heads of state. Therefore, it appears likely to once again question whether this judicial 
practice by international tribunals in respect to immunities has evolved to a customary rule of 
international law. In the following, probably the most relevant judgment to date in relation to 
sitting heads of state before an international tribunal will be considered: it is the case of since 
2019 ex-Sudanese head of state, Omar Al-Bashir. This case is interesting because it raises 
several issues, first in regard to the court’s jurisdiction, since Sudan is not a state party to the 
ICC, and also to Al-Bashir’s entitlement to immunity as a (then) sitting head of state. 
 
a) The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir 
 
Since Sudan gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1956, it has suffered several 
violent conflicts. The most recent one has been ongoing since the year 2003 in Darfur, where 
investigations showed that the Sudanese government resorted to serious human rights 
violations like systematic killing, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide as a 
response to military activities of rebel groups.105 This caused for massive concern within the 
international community, who saw the need to rapidly act within the existing legal framework. 
However, Sudan’s position as a non-party state to the Rome Statute meant that the 
prosecutor of the ICC could not, ex officio, prosecute those responsible for the alleged 
crimes. In view of this, two years after the outbreak of violence in Darfur, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) determined that the situation constituted ‘a threat to international 
peace and security’ and acting under its Chapter VII UN Charter powers adopted Resolution 
1593 (2005) thereby referring the situation to the prosecutor of the ICC. This conferred 
jurisdiction to the court pursuant to article 13 (b) Rome Statute.106  
On the 4th of March of 2009, the Pre-trial Chamber I (PTC I) of the ICC issued an arrest 
warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity, which was amended a year later by a 
second warrant to include the crime of genocide, against (then) acting Sudanese president 
Omar Al-Bashir.107 Subject of a brief analysis and a subsequent critical assessment will be 
two differently reasoned decisions of the ICC regarding Al-Bashir’s immunities: the decision 
                                                     
104
 Charles Taylor (immunity), para. 51. 
105
 Schabas, p. 50; Trahan, Fordham Int’l L.J., 04/2008, p. 990 (990 ff.); Jones, 6/2009, p. 13 (14); Kelly, UC 
Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y, 18/2011, p. 205 (206 ff.). 
106
 UNSC, Resolution 1593, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 [2005]. 
107
 ICC (PTC I) Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir (The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, 4 March 2009 
[hereinafter Arrest Warrant]; ICC (PTC I) Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (The 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95, 12 July 2010. 
 
19 
on the Arrest Warrant of 2009108 and the latest decision on the failure by Jordan to comply 
with its obligations arising under the Rome Statute109. The analysis of these decisions is of 
crucial importance for the aim of this paper, namely, to determine if there is an immunity 
exception for heads of state because they reflect customary international law rules or rules 
that are widely recognized by the world community.  
 
aa) Judgment of 4 March 2009 
 
In its first decision the ICC was faced with determining whether the case against Al-Bashir 
fell within its jurisdiction. Hence, the court considered its jurisdiction ratione loci, ratione 
temporis, ratione materiae and ratione personae. The court determined that it had obtained 
jurisdiction ratione loci and temporis, pursuant to article 13 (b) Rome Statute through the 
UNSC referral: this encompassed the crimes occurred in the territory of Darfur (Sudan) since 
1 July 2002.110 Further, the court found it had jurisdiction ratione materiae since the conducts 
Al-Bashir was accused of constituted genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.111 
Finally, the most relevant question raised related to its jurisdiction ratione personae. 
Especially whether the immunity exclusion of article 27 Rome Statute applied to the present 
case or if instead Al-Bashir enjoyed full personal immunity, considering his status as the then 
sitting head of state of Sudan, a country not party to the Rome Statute. This was the first time 
the court had to decide on its jurisdiction ratione personae in regard to a sitting head of state 
of a non-party state, making the outcome of the judgment extremely relevant and influential. 
The ICC found that ‘the current position of Omar Al-Bashir as a Head of a State which is not 
party to the Statute, has no effect on the Court’s jurisdiction over the present case’.112 To 
reason this conclusion, the court offered the following arguments: first, the court refered to 
the preamble of the Rome Statute which contains the primary objective of the court, namely 
that of ending impunity for international crimes.113 Further, it claimed that in aim of achieving 
this objective the Rome Statute adopted ‘core principles’ which are embodied in article 27 of 
the Rome Statute and expressly exclude any personal or functional immunities before the 
court.114 On the question of the applicable law the court considered, under scrutiny of the 
requirements set out in article 21 Rome Statute, if recourse to international law beyond the 
Rome Statute was necessary. It held that this was not the case, because the Rome Statute 
leaves no legal loophole in relation to immunities.115 The closing argument was arguably also 
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the most compelling: the court held that the referral of the situation in Darfur by the UNSC to 
the ICC entailed the application of all its regulatory instruments to the proceedings against 
Al-Bashir, which includes the Rome Statute.116  
 
bb) Judgment of 6 May 2019 
 
On May 6th 2019 the Appeals Chamber of the ICC issued a judgment on whether Jordan had 
violated its international obligations arising out of the Rome Statute to arrest and surrender 
Al-Bashir in a visit to the country in March of 2017. According to article 86 Rome Statute, 
contracting parties are under a binding obligation to ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’. In the present 
case, it meant that all state parties to the Rome Statute were under a treaty obligation to 
arrest and surrender Al-Bashir, when in their territory, observing the arrest warrants issued 
against him in 2009 and 2010 by the ICC. However, many countries failed to comply with 
their obligations under the Rome Statute, highly influenced by the position adopted by the 
African Union, which formally rejected these warrants and urged its member states not to 
cooperate with the ICC.117 This defiance is reflected in a series of judgments delivered by the 
ICC which under article 87 (7) Rome Statute condemned the lack of action taken by the 
states in question.118 These non-complying countries often argued that arresting a sitting 
head of state of a non-party state to the Rome Statute, who enjoys under international law 
immunity ratione personae, would have been in breach of their international obligations, 
recalling article 98 (1) Rome Statute which reads: ‘The Court may not proceed with a request 
for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a 
person or property of a third State […]’ 
The central question in the present case against Jordan was whether a sitting head of state 
from a non-party state to the Rome Statute but under its jurisdiction through a UNSC referral 
is immune from arrest and surrender by an ICC member state, and thus whether Jordan 
could rely on Art. 98 (1) Rome Statute. In its defense, Jordan’s counsel argued that arresting 
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Al-Bashir would have been in breach of its obligations under international law because 
customary international law grants sitting heads of state immunity ratione personae.119 
Furthermore, the exclusion of immunity for heads of state contained in article 27 (2) Rome 
Statute did not apply to Al-Bashir, because Sudan was not a state party to the Rome Statute. 
120 The UNSC referral only affected the relationship between Sudan and the ICC but did not 
remove Al-Bashir’s immunity vis-à-vis other states.121 However, the court concluded that 
immunity could not be upheld in such a case therefore finding that Jordan had indeed not 
complied with its obligations arising under the Rome Statute.122 This judgment is of special 
interest because the ICC combined its two lines of reasoning to explain the exclusion of 
sitting head of state immunity before the court. One is based on customary international law 
and the other on the UNSC referral and the obligation of Sudan to ‘cooperate fully’ with the 
court.123  
As previously mentioned124 article 27 (2) Rome Statute provides that ‘immunities […] shall 
not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction […]’ and according to the ICC, this provision 
has the status of customary international law. To support this argument, the court noted that 
provisions barring immunity before international criminal tribunals were formulated inter alia 
in the Nuremberg Charter, the Convention against Genocide and in the statutes of the ICTY, 
ICTR and SCSL.125 It also mentioned the indictment and prosecution of sitting heads of state 
before international criminal courts like Charles Taylor126 or Slobodan Milošević127 to provide 
further evidence of a customary international law exception to head of state immunity.128 On 
the contrary, the court observed that immunity of former or sitting heads of state has never 
been upheld before international criminal tribunals.129 This is partly due to the singular 
character of international tribunals in comparison to domestic courts: international tribunals 
act on behalf of the ‘international community as a whole’ and the principle of par in parem 
non habet imperium does not apply in this case.130 Further, the court endorsed its previous 
(somewhat controversial) Malawi decision stating that it was ‘fully satisfied that the 
pronouncements made by the Pre-Trial Chamber I […] have adequately and correctly 
confirmed the absence of a rule of customary international law recognizing Head of State 
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immunity before international courts in the exercise of proper jurisdiction.’131 It hence 
acknowledged that by acceding the Rome Statute, state parties had given up head of state 
immunity in proceedings before the court, both in the vertical relationship with the court and 
in the ‘horizontal relationship between state parties […] if the Court is asking for the arrest 
and surrender of a person.’132 
The second avenue taken by the court focused on the UNSC referral. The court pointed out 
that despite Sudan’s status as a non-party to the Rome Statute, it is still bound by the 
authority of the UNSC as a member to the United Nations.133 The referral of the situation in 
Darfur to the ICC via Resolution 1593 (2005)134 triggered the court’s jurisdiction, as 
established in article 13 (b) Rome Statute, which it must exercise in accordance with the 
Rome Statute’s provisions.135 According to set resolution, Jordan had the obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC, giving effect to the arrest warrant.136 Furthermore, the resolution 
created a distinct obligation for Sudan, then bound to ‘cooperate fully with and provide 
necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor’ so that the cooperation regime 
applicable to states parties, namely article 86 Rome Statute, was from this moment onward 
also applicable to Sudan’s cooperation with the court.137 This includes the application of 
article 27 (2) Rome Statute, which precludes the defense of immunity, in words of the court 
‘full cooperation in accordance with the Statute encompasses all those obligations that 
States Parties owe to the Court and that are necessary for effective exercise of jurisdiction by 
the Court.’138 It goes without say that if Sudan could invoke immunity of its (then) sitting head 
of state it would be impossible to prosecute him, making ‘full cooperation’ as required by 
Resolution 1593 (2005) impossible.139  
At this point it might be necessary to recall that Jordan claimed that Al-Bashir not having 
immunity before the ICC does not mean that he does not enjoy immunity from arrest by other 
states (e.g. Jordan) acting at the request of an international criminal court. The court 
however rejected this argument insisting that the effect of article 27 (2) Rome Statute also 
arises in the horizontal relationship between Sudan and other states or else this provision 
would be rendered ineffective.140 In any case, if Jordan considered arresting Al-Bashir 
incompatible with its obligations it should have initiated the consultation procedure pursuant 
to article 97 Rome Statute and not unilaterally decide not to cooperate with the court.141  
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b) Preliminary critical assessment 
These judgments delivered by the ICC are subject of great controversy. The criticism focuses 
especially on the immunity exception and the question whether it was applicable to Al-Bashir 
or not. Therefore, a tentative appraisal of both judgments may be useful to further 
understand the issues and points of criticism.  
The ICC decision of 4 March 2009 has been widely discussed in legal literature, with many 
scholars arguing that article 27 Rome Statute cannot be applicable to non-party states and 
others who agree with the findings of the court but consider the analysis unconvincing.142 
Furthermore, regional international organizations like the Islamic Conference, the Arab 
League and in particular the African Union strongly opposed the court’s decision to issue an 
arrest warrant against Al-Bashir.143 I must agree with those scholars who find the conclusion 
reached by the court correct but criticize the reasoning. The first consideration raised by the 
court refers to the aim of the ICC to fight impunity for international crimes, which is embodied 
in the preamble of its statute. This objective, while being legitimate seems however an 
unsuitable basis to support the exclusion of Al-Bashir’s immunity, since the case concerns a 
non-party state. Considering that Sudan has not ratified the treaty, the goals and objectives 
set out therein do not create any international obligations for the country.  
The second argument is inappropriate for a similar reason as the first one. Indeed, the 
exclusion of immunity reflects a core principle of the Rome Statute. However, only in respect 
to the nationals of states which have ratified the statute, therefore excluding Sudan. In its 
third argument, the judges held the view that in the absence of a legal loophole, only the 
Rome Statute applied to the proceedings, disregarding other rules of international law set out 
in article 21 (1) Rome Statute. For any statute provision to apply (in this case article 27 Rome 
Statute) over a customary law norm to a non-party state, it must go beyond being a treaty 
provision: it must reflect a principle of customary international law.144 Thus, the legal validity 
of the rule does not emanate from the consent of the parties but from its character as 
customary law. This problem was not addressed by the court, which could have rightfully 
applied to Sudan the immunity exclusion rule arguing its customary law status. Finally, the 
court pointed out that Sudan, as a member State to the UN has accepted to comply with 
binding UNSC resolutions, such as Resolution 1593 (2005) which refers the situation in 
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Darfur to the ICC. The only logical interpretation therefore is that through a referral from the 
UNSC to the ICC, Sudan is put in the same position as an ICC party, having to comply with 
the Rome Statute.145 This reasoning, which is in my opinion the most convincing one in this 
judgment, has been used by the court the case concerning the non-compliance with the 
arrest warrant by South Africa.146  
The second decision mentioned in this paper is the latest Judgment in the Al-Bashir case of 
2019 against Jordan. It follows the ten-year trend of ICC judgments in the Al-Bashir case, in 
which the court has never recognized his immunity.147 Other than in its earliest judgement in 
discussed above, the court clarified that the irrelevance of immunities vis-à-vis international 
courts is not a mere treaty provision enshrined in article 27 Rome Statute, but a rule of 
customary international law that therefore also applies to non-state parties.148 It also argued 
that the UNSC referral conferred an obligation to both Sudan and Jordan to cooperate with 
the ICC. The reasoning followed by the court in this case should be welcomed, particularly 
the diligent assessment undertaken in regard to the immunity exception of heads of state 
before international criminal courts and its customary law character. As previously 
mentioned, for a treaty provision to be considered customary international law it must enjoy 
sufficient state practice and opinio juris. Hence, to reason the customary law character of 
article 27 Rome Statute the court noted that cases such as Taylor or Milošević serve as state 
practice while the existence of an immunity exclusion provision in virtually all statutes of 
international criminal tribunals since World War II as opinio juris. I agree with this conclusion 
since like the court, I find there to be sufficient state practice and opinio juris to make such an 
affirmation.  
The first real indicator of state practice can be said to be the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, in 
which major war figures and serving high-ranking officials of Nazi Germany (Dönitz) and 
Japan were prosecuted. Other notorious cases include the indictment of Milošević by the 
ICTY while he was serving, Kambanda’s conviction by the ICTR, the indictment of Kenyatta 
by the ICC in 2011 or the warrants issued against Muamar and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi by the 
ICC, which were not enforced due to the death of father and son months later. One might 
argue that in all the above-mentioned cases of prosecution and even conviction of sitting or 
former heads of state or high-ranking officials (except in the case of Gaddafi) they were 
nationals of states parties to the respective applicable statute, which is different in the case 
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of Sudan and the Rome Statute. While this certainly holds truth, this cannot be used to 
undermine the existence of sufficient state practice, which exists regardless of a statute 
membership. Furthermore, there is a clear universal consensus that people who commit 
international crimes should be held responsible and that immunities should not stand in the 
way of it. This is reflected by the ratification of the Rome Statute by 123 countries that have 
voluntarily accepted to be under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Therefore, as the court correctly 
pointed out, an immunity exception of sitting or former heads of state before international 
criminal tribunals is customary international law. General149 customary law is, in principle, 
binding an all states.150 Hence, it means that all nationals regardless of their state’s ICC 
membership or the existence of a UNSC referral, cannot claim immunity as a legitimate 
procedural bar before international criminal tribunals in proceedings against them. I 
mentioned that they are ‘in principle’ applicable to all states because according to the 
persistent objector doctrine, states which persistently object to the application of a customary 
international law rule during its emergence, are exempt from its application when it finally 
crystallizes into such.151 It seems like Jordan and Sudan could have relied on the persistent 
objector doctrine to avoid the application of the immunity exception on them. However, 
neither party decided to bring up this argument. In the case of Jordan, this might have to do 
with the fact that it is a party to the Rome Statute. From expressly accepting the Rome 
Statute’s legal provisions, the opinio juris element of customary international law, i.e. 
Jordan’s belief it is complying with a legal obligation could be satisfied.152 It is also 
questionable whether the doctrine could have succeeded, since the customary law rule of not 
granting sitting heads of state immunity before international criminal tribunals concerns the 
protection of jus cogens crimes enshrined in the Rome Statute.153 Furthermore, the 
persistent objector doctrine is gradually diminishing and the affected state tends to base its 
claim on either the meaning and the scope of the accepted rule or argue that a rule has not 
yet become customary law.154 The fulfillment of the timely objection criteria also raises 
doubts, since the customary law rule was not emerging at the time the judgment was 
delivered but, according to the court, already existing.155 This might be some of the reasons 
why Sudan chose not to pursue this controversial line of defense. Anyhow, there is also a 
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compelling argument for limiting the application of the persistent objector doctrine regarding 
international human rights rules.156 The idea of human rights is linked to the idea of their 
universality, meaning that they have to exist everywhere and be available to everyone – 
safeguarding certain cultural exceptionalisms.157 The universality of human rights is therefore 
in inherent tension with the persistent objector doctrine, which limits the enforceability of 
certain customary international rules that exist to protect human rights.158 
At this point, the backlash this judgment has received should be addressed. Several legal 
experts have fiercely criticized the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber as confusing, 
incoherent or even deeply misguided.159 Some have argued that through this decision article 
98 (1) Rome Statute, which reads: ‘The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender 
or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a 
person or property of a third State, […].’ has been rendered irrelevant.160 Indeed, that might 
be a coherent interpretation of the judgment. However, this accusation mistakes the non- 
applicability of article 98 (1) as a diminishment of the provision. At a closer look, the non-
applicability of article 98 (1) is the mere consequence of recognizing the irrelevance of 
immunities vis-à-vis international courts as a rule of customary law. Furthermore, the 
purpose of article 98 (1) was not to be used as a means to avoid cooperation with the court 
in the prosecution of international crimes.161 Another point of criticism relates to the 
distinction of the court drawn between domestic jurisdictions and international courts 
regarding head of state immunity. According to the court international tribunals are impartial 
by nature. As they do not act on behalf of a state and are thus not an expression of a state’s 
sovereign power, which is necessarily limited by the sovereign power of other states, the 
principle of sovereign equality that applies between states does not apply before an 
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international court.162 Some authors argue that this could lead to absurd situations, like two 
countries creating an international tribunal to prosecute the head of state of a third country, 
which would be possible according to the court’s reasoning.163 This not only undermines the 
principle pacta non tertiis but it is manifestly contrary to international law, since states cannot 
grant an international tribunal powers they do not possess (e.g. the power to adjudicate over 
a third-country head of state).164 I agree, an ‘international’ tribunal created by country A and 
B to adjudicate over country C goes against many principles of international law. However, I 
do not find that the court’s decision stands up to this argument: that conclusion does not take 
into account the succeeding passage of the judgment, in which the court clearly 
characterizes international courts as acting ‘on behalf of the international community as a 
whole’.165 All international courts mentioned in this paper like ICTY, ICTR, SCSL or ICC did in 
fact act on behalf of the international community: the first three were set up by the UN which 
has as members 193 sovereign states while the ICC counts 123 state parties, making its 
universality undeniable. Moreover, international criminal tribunals have mechanisms in place 
to avoid their own abuse of power. The ICC, for example, needs to obtain jurisdiction over 
non-party states before it can act. This is only possible through a UNSC referral, i.e. when 
the UNSC classifies the situation in the country in question as a ‘threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace or acts of aggression’. An ‘international tribunal’ which does not contain in its 
statute any minimal procedural safeguards will, possibly, not be recognized by many 
countries for lacking seriousness and legal basis. Hence, in light of the aforementioned 
arguments, the assumption that two countries can in fact strip a third country of its 
sovereignty right by creating an ‘international tribunal’ and prosecuting a third country’s head 
of state is not only unrealistic but not foreseen or included in the court’s Jordan judgment. 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning the court’s examination of the interaction between a UNSC 
referral and the immunities and obligations of a non-party state under the Rome Statute. In 
sum, the referral imposed the obligation on Sudan to cooperate with the court as if it were a 
state party, which led to the application of the Rome Statute. Since the Rome Statute 
includes an immunity exclusion provision, Al-Bashir could not enjoy immunity as the 
Sudanese head of state before the ICC. This second approach taken by the court made the 
judgment more convincing. Had the court exhausted its analysis on the customary law 
character of the rule, the outcome could have raised (more) doubts, since the application of 
customary law rules determined by the ICC to a non-party state, like Sudan, is questionable. 
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Anyhow, Al-Bashir’s fate nowadays seems clearer than it was years before: since he was 
ousted in April of 2019, Sudan’s transitional government has agreed to hand him over to the 
ICC. This makes the delicate matter of removing Al-Bashir’s immunity ratione personae an 
internal decision by Sudan’s authorities and not anymore, the ICC’s responsibility. This 
avoids an uncomfortable situation for both Sudan, AU countries and the ICC: on the one 
hand, neither Sudan nor parties to the AU have to breach their allegiance to the organization 
by complying with the ICC. On the other hand, the ICC can finally steer clear of accusations 
that it racially profiles countries by only targeting African heads of state or that it breaches a 
state’s sovereignty and international law. However, the lessons learned from the ten-year 
battle in the Al-Bashir saga between countries who resisted to give up the immunities of 
heads of state accused of international crimes and the ICC, will without doubt be of great 




The present paper considered the problem of immunity of serving and former heads of state 
from the jurisdiction of national and international courts by analyzing two landmark judgments 
concerning this topic. These decisions were complemented with other relevant judgments to 
reflect the current state practice and to provide a clear indication of what the existing opinio 
juris is. In the following, I will outline the main observations made throughout this paper. 
There is a universal consensus that sitting heads of state enjoy absolute immunity ratione 
personae before foreign domestic courts.166 This has been reaffirmed inter alia by the 
Pinochet No. 3 judgment and the subsequent Arrest Warrant167 case before the ICJ. 
However, the same cannot be said for former heads of state.168 The groundbreaking 
Pinochet No. 3 paved the way for convicting former heads of state of international crimes at 
the national level. In this sense, Belgium in 2003 brought a case against former Chadian 
dictator Hissene Habré and Spain in 2006 issued two arrest warrants against former 
Guatemalan president Efraín Ríos Montt for international crimes.169 However, these 
prosecutions were unsuccessful, and the two ex-presidents were years later tried before 
other criminal tribunals: an ad-hoc tribunal created by the African Union in the case of Habré 
and before Guatemalan national courts in the case of Ríos Montt.  
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It is thus difficult to deduce any clear rules regarding immunities of former heads of state in 
proceedings before foreign domestic courts. One reason is because it is exceptionally 
difficult for a foreign national court to gather the necessary evidence to achieve a conviction, 
therefore they rarely get involved in prosecuting foreign heads of state. Another reason is 
that there is a great disparity in the outcomes, which makes it difficult to define a trend.170 
Furthermore, the risk of politization and destabilization when domestic court act unilaterally 
(put forward e.g. by Lord Goff in the Pinochet No. 3 judgment) is another argument for 
upholding immunity before national domestic courts. In any case, if a former head of state 
fears prosecution by a foreign domestic court he/she will likely avoid that risk by simply not 
travelling to that country, rendering such prosecutions more symbolic than effective. Thus, 
although international law opens the possibility for former heads of state to be tried at a 
national level for international crimes due to the significant drawbacks that such a proceeding 
can entail it does not seem like the most appropriate forum.  
However, the situation appears differently in relation to international tribunals. The decisions 
of international criminal tribunals show that neither functional nor personal immunities of 
heads of state prevent them from prosecution. As the ICJ restated in the Arrest Warrant 
case, even sitting heads of State do not retain their personal immunity before ‘certain 
international tribunals’.171 The legal basis can be found first in an immunity removal clause in 
every statute of international(zed) tribunals, including in the Rome Statute. ICC state parties 
have voluntarily waived their right to immunity claims before the court. The creation of 
international tribunals is linked to the idea of prosecuting heads of state, high-ranking officials 
and other individuals who would normally enjoy immunity for international crimes. Hence, 
removing any prerogatives that bar prosecution seems like a logical conclusion of the 
creation of international criminal tribunals.  
The most interesting observation found in this paper is, however, the customary law 
character of the immunity ratione personae exclusion for heads of state before international 
criminal tribunals.172 First of all, this goes to show the evolving nature of customary 
international law, which went from preserving core principles such as head of state immunity 
to de jure and de facto eliminating it for jus cogens prohibitions, concretely international 
crimes. Second, it is beyond doubt that this finding included in the Jordan judgment, will have 
far-reaching consequences regarding party and non-party states to the Rome Statute. It is 
now clear that when the ICC issues an arrest warrant against a non-party sitting head of 
state, all state parties are under a legal obligation to execute it.173 Countries unwilling to 
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cooperate with the ICC’s warrants cannot justify their inactivity by resorting to article 98 (1) 
Rome Statute. This is justified on the ground that heads of state do not enjoy, as a matter of 
customary international law, any immunities vis-à-vis international criminal tribunals.174 
Because this principle also applies in the horizontal relationship between states, executing 
arrest warrants would not lead to any state acting ‘inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law’. As I mentioned, the Jordan judgment also impacts the immunity of heads 
of state of non-party states in their relationship to the ICC or, possibly, other international 
criminal tribunals. If the ICC through a UNSC referral obtains jurisdiction over a non-party 
state, that state will likewise have to observe (1) the Rome Statute, since through a UNSC 
referral the same cooperation regime applied to state parties is applied to non-party states175 
and (2) customary international law rules crystallized by the ICC, i.e. the exclusion of head of 
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